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I. INTRODUCTION
Aside from interpretations of the substantive law, the level of private
antitrust enforcement in both the United States and the European Union
is a function of a number of factors. The most important of these are: (1)
The availability of punitive or exemplary damages; (2) The possibility
of recovering attorney's fees; (3) The difficulty of creating a class of
plaintiffs or of obtaining collective redress; (4) The ease of discovery;
and (5) Definitions of what qualifies one to bring a private action. This
discussion is about the last of these-eligibility or, in the language of
U.S. antitrust law, standing.' Eligibility or antitrust standing alone,
however, is a relatively empty notion as far as having an impact on the
actual level of private actions.2 Consequently the focus here is more
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of law. University of Florida College of Law.
1. Standing, as will be discussed below, means one is eligible to bring an antitrust
action. As a general matter it means one has been directly affected by the alleged violation of
the antitrust laws.
2. The rationale for this is easy to understand. An eligible plaintiff who has only a 50%
chance of prevailing and who may only recover single damages and no punitive damages may
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operational and adopts the concept of "functional standing." More
specifically: What is the likelihood that private enforcement will be a
significant force with respect to antitrust enforcement? Functional
standing is dependent upon standing in the formal sense-a procedural
component-and expected or likely damages-a substantive
component.
To date, and despite pressures toward convergence,3 the United
States and the European Union have taken different paths with respect
to the enforcement of antitrust laws by private parties and, therefore,
differ dramatically in levels of functional standing. U.S. law is more
encouraging to private enforcement than E.U. law but has a narrower
view of whom those private parties are permitted to be.4 In the
European Union, the eligible parties are broad but the motivation of any
single party to bring an action is quite low.
In the United States, the substantive law and much of the procedural
law flow from federal courts' interpretations of the Sherman Act5 and
the Clayton Act.6 Because this is all federal law, general statements are
more appropriate. In the European Union, the substantive antitrust
provisions are those found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.7 Procedural requirements as they pertain to private
actions are determined by national courts.8 Consequently, any general
statements about the eligibility or standing are more problematic.
Indeed, one of the issues faced by the European Union is achieving
not find ligation attractive. The fact that standing exists in a technical sense is, therefore,
irrelevant.
3. See generally Kfir Abutbul, The US. and E. U Approaches to Competition Law -
Convergent or Divergent Paths? 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 103 (2010). The most recent indication
of convergence is a July 11, 2013 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council [hereinafter "Proposal"]. That proposal was adopted by the Council of the European
Union and the European Parliament in December 2013. It requires approval by the European
Parliament and the European Commission after which member states would be given two years
to adopt the contained proposals. Those proposals would make private actions far more likely.
See Proposal for a Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/actionsdamages/proposed directiveen.html (last visited, Jan. 15, 2014).
4. In light of current events national policy could change but at this point those changes
are at best years away. Francesco Rizzuto, The Private Enforcement of European Competition
Law, What Next?, 2010 GLOBAL COMPETITION LITIGATION REv. 57 (2010); Marc A. Sittenreich,
The Rocky Path for Public Directors General: Procedure, Politics, and the Uncertain Future of
EU Damages Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2703 (2010); see also Assimakis P. Komninos,
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement: quod Dei Deo, quod Caesari,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1870723 (last visited Feb. 2. 2014).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
6. Id. Individual states may have their own antitrust provisions but these may not
conflict with federal law.
7. 55 Official Journal of the European Union, L235 (Sept. 1, 2012).
8. Francis G. Jacobs, Civil Enforcement of EEC Antitrust Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1364,
1367-68 (1984).
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some uniformity with respect to eligibility issues. Nevertheless, as a
general matter, there seems to be little question that Europe as a whole
is struggling with the eligibility question and whether private
enforcement is destined to be a significant factor. Official statements
favor greater private enforcement,9 but the actual incentives for bringing
private actions are not compelling.'0 In fact, efforts in the European
Union to make compensation broadly available seem destined to have
little impact.
Part II sets out the basic legal analysis of "functional eligibility" in
the United States and the European Union. Private enforcement,
however, is only relevant with respect to specific goals. In antitrust,
those goals are compensation and deterrence. Thus the question is: How
do two different approaches to functional standing advance two goals
that themselves are not always consistent? The purpose of Part I is to
describe the two models sufficiently to then apply them to different
standard antitrust violations. It concludes the E.U. system, as currently
constructed and likely to exist in the future, does not have and will not
have a private regime of enforcement that advances either goal. In Part
III, this is illustrated in the context of specific economic models.
Two important qualifying notes are in order. First, this offering is
about private enforcement only. In both the United States and the
European Union, the overall impact of enforcement efforts will be
determined by both public and private actions. Weak private
enforcement can be offset by strong public enforcement and this applies
to both the compensation and deterrence goals." Second, the discussion
also does not consider the varying impacts of different policies in
individual E.U. member states. The impact of efforts to expand
functional standing in any member state will be affected by the
availability of collective redress in that state and punitive damages.
II. THE ELIGIBILITY QUESTION
As a matter of theory, the possibility of private enforcement exists
along a continuum ranging from very likely to nonexistent. For
example, a set of antitrust laws could be enacted that involve no public
enforcement at all but which allow anyone-whether affected or not-
to file an action and collect punitive or statutory damages. This might be
9. SIMON VANDE WALLE, PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
JAPAN 162-63 (2013).
10. In effect, increased eligibility without the promise of punitive damages may mean
that private enforcement is no more likely.
11. A strong deterrence function alleviates the need for compensation by preventing harm
in the first place.
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called the pure "bounty hunter" model. Between the bounty hunter
model and one in which there is no private enforcement there are a
number-perhaps an infinite number-of positions. The position
chosen is ultimately a matter of policy and can be compared to turning
on or off a private enforcement faucet. This faucet can be adjusted in a
number of ways but, for purposes of this article, the faucet is controlled
by the breadth of functional standing which is in itself dependent on
both eligibility and financial incentives. One without the other means
little or no private enforcement.
On first impression the choice of how to proceed with respect to
eligibility seems to turn on whether the goal of antitrust law is to
compensate victims or to deter anticompetitive conduct before the
damages occur. A regime of antitrust law designed to compensate those
harmed may look quite different from one designed to punish and deter
anticompetitive actions. In the latter case, private actions would have to
be readily available. At the most basic level, the question in this respect
is closely related to the difference between a civil action based on a tort
theory and the enforcement of criminal law. In the tort example, the
objective is simply to restore the party damaged to a "but for"
position.12 In fact, those measures may still mean anticompetitive action
has a net positive outcome for those involved. Put differently, if the
only goal is compensation, then from the firm's point of view, it may be
profit maximizing to harm others as long as the revenues generated
exceed the cost of compensation.
3
In the deterrent or criminal law model, the objective is to prevent the
damage from occurring.'4 This objective is achieved by going further
than requiring the offending party to pay damages or to disgorge any ill-
gotten gains. Punitive sanctions are typically designed to eliminate the
profitability of anticompetitive conduct. These punitive sanctions can be
implemented by fines, imprisonment, or awarding supra compensatory
damages. One need not compensate victims in order to deter
anticompetitive conduct.
The distinction between compensation and deterrence is, however,
more theoretical than real. Anticompetitive conduct generates
externalities in the form of higher prices, lower output, and reduced
12. This assumes the absence of punitive damages. Although a highly artificial notion,
the idea is to compensate the individual so that he or she would be indifferent between suffering
the harm and being compensated and not suffering the harm at all.
13. Those familiar with contract law will recognize this as analogous to the "efficient
breach." In effect, the profit from a violation may exceed the damages to those harmed by the
violation. In addition, unless the expected recovery is 100 percent, the expected damages to be
paid by the offending party will be consistently less than the actual harm caused.
14. It does this by making the expected loss in litigation exceed the expected gains.
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consumer surplus.'5 Compensation offsets that harm, when, and if, all
victims are assured of full compensation. Thus, the tort-like regime does
restore victims who prevail in a sometimes risky private action. On the
other hand, the deterrence model achieves the same end by ensuring that
the externality does not occur in the first place. There is no need for
restoration if the harm does not occur. In short, antitrust violations are
penalized not because of a widespread belief that they are morally
reprehensible but because deterrence is a more effective way to address
the compensation problem. Moreover, if the only goal is prevention, the
eligibility issue is beside the point-any measure that makes
anticompetitive behavior unprofitable will achieve that end. Of course,
the idea that the deterrence model could ever advance to the point of
eliminating any need for ex post compensation is fanciful for it would
mean there are no violations and, thus, no enforcement actions at all.
1 6
Nevertheless, a regime that appears to be strictly deterrence oriented
may actually have a powerful compensatory effect. On the other hand,
one that is compensation oriented may, subject to the availability of
public sanctions, have a very limited deterrent effect. In the next parts,
the two systems are examined to determine which model they fit.
A. The United States
In the United States, deterrence is favored over compensation but
compensation remains an important objective. This is a result of the
combined effect of three doctrines-antitrust injury, antitrust standing,
and the availability of treble damages.17 An antitrust injury is the type of
injury the antitrust laws are designed to prevent. This limitation results
from the statutory requirement that damages only be awarded to those
injured "by reason" of activities forbidden by the antitrust laws.18 The
seminal case is Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat. 19 In that case
the plaintiff, an operator of bowling alleys, challenged the acquisition of
a competing but failing bowling alley by an upstream supplier arguing
that it was an unlawful merger.
The Supreme Court, in ruling that the plaintiff had not suffered
antitrust injury, did not address the merits of the claim. Instead, the
15. Consumer surplus is a measure of the benefit to the consumer of buying an item. It is
the difference between the amount paid and the most the consumer would be willing to play. For
a market, the total consumer surplus is the sum of the consumer surpluses associated with all
sales.
16. Any public enforcement action automatically means that there has been harm and,
thus, the need for compensation.
17. See generally E. Thomas Sullivan & Jeffrey L. Harrison, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 49-68 (6th ed. 2014).
18. The language is from Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
19. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
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plaintiff was ruled, in effect, "ineligible." 20 The plaintiffs goal in
invoking the antitrust laws was to advance its desire to gain market
power. The harm from the merger-the inability of the plaintiff to
become a monopolist itself-was not "antitrust injury." This is not to
say the merger would not ultimately be anticompetitive. That question
was not addressed. Instead, the plaintiffs injury was not linked to the
possibility of a less competitive market. The antitrust injury requirement
is one way in which U.S. law deviates significantly from the pure
"bounty hunter" model.2'
The second requirement-standing-is that the plaintiff must not be
too remotely affected by the anticompetitive act.-2 While the injury
requirement can be viewed as a straight-forward interpretation of the
"by reason of' language of the relevant legislation, the standing
requirement is a bit more nebulous and probably more clearly reflects
judicial philosophy with respect to the proper level of private antitrust
enforcement and its purpose. The standard has been interpreted to mean
that an eligible plaintiff must be an efficient enforcer of the antitrust
laws. What this means precisely cannot be determined. Important
elements include how directly the impact is felt and the likelihood that
the plaintiff or plaintiffs are in the best position to advance the
procompetitive goals of the antitrust laws.23 For example, a buyer or
seller may have suffered antitrust injury but only as a result of an action
that took place several layers above or below the victim in the chain of
distribution. That party may have suffered relatively small damages and
it would be quite challenging to establish what the actual measure of
damages is. This plaintiff would not be viewed as the best private party
to advance the goals of the antitrust laws.
The doctrines of antitrust injury and standing developed
independently and in a common law like fashion. They have both been
revisited and refined over the last four decades.24 Today, it is accurate to
say that in order to have antitrust standing one must have suffered an
antitrust injury. Conversely, not all those suffering antitrust injury have
antitrust standing. It is important to note a third standard that influences
the eligibility issue in certain cases. It fits most logically under the
concept of antitrust standing but, because of the sequence in which the
U.S. Supreme Court decided the relevant cases, it was not officially
20. Id. at 489.
21. The bounty hunter model would be one that brought any violator of the antitrust laws
"to justice" regardless of the impact on that party.
22. See Sullivan & Harrison, supra note 17, at 53-55.
23. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
541-42 (1983).
24. See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in
Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1999).
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viewed as a standing decision. The issue involves the eligibility of those
who purchase from those who have paid supracompetitive prices due to
collusion of their suppliers. Specifically, if a firm buys from another
firm that itself buys from upstream firms that are price fixing, can that
indirect purchaser collect damages based on the amount of the
overcharge2 5 that is passed through by the firm from which it
purchased? The U.S. Supreme Court, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
26
answered that indirect purchasers may not recover. As already noted,
the decision was made before modem injury and standing doctrines
became focused. A more modem interpretation of the policy is that
indirect purchasers from price fixing firms have suffered antitrust injury
but ultimately do not have standing.
The direct/indirect purchaser standards, like standing more
generally, do not necessarily flow from the U.S. antitrust statutes but
reflect judicial efforts to answer questions left open by that legislation.
Although these doctrines are relatively well developed in U.S. antitrust
law, there are important nuances that should not be missed. First, the
fact that a party may lack standing or may not have suffered an antitrust
injury does not involve the question of whether there has been a
substantive violation of the antitrust laws. For example, as already
noted, in the leading antitrust injury case, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat,27 the Court did not reach the issue of whether
anticompetitive actions had occurred. Instead, in an injury inquiry, a
court examines the plaintiffs theory of how it was injured individually
and if that injury is the type the antitrust laws are designed to avoid. If
not, the inquiry stops. A ruling that a party does not have standing
creates the risk of an under-enforcement error. A ruling that a party does
have standing does not, however, create the risk of over-enforcement
since that party must still demonstrate a substantive violation.
A final element that complements the ideas of standing and antitrust
injury is the availability of treble damages.28 In effect, plaintiffs
demonstrating damages recover that amount multiplied by three. The
importance of this can be understood by noting the simple cost/benefit
analysis of the decision to pursue an antitrust action. The probability of
prevailing in any antitrust action is less than 100%. This means that if
the only damages recoverable are equal to the actual harm the expected
recovery is always less that the amount of harm. More importantly, the
expected loss to the defendant will also be less that the harm caused. A
regime of single damages discourages private enforcement efforts and
25. The overcharge is the difference between the price charged by the price fixing firms
and that charged in the absence of price fixing.
26. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977).
27. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 488 (1977).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
277
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increases the profitability of engaging in anticompetitive activities.
When all of these factors are combined, the U.S. system is more
deterrence centered than compensation centered. This is principally a
consequence of a relatively narrow standard with regard to standing
particularly in the form of excluding indirect purchasers. A focus on
compensation, as noted earlier, is one that attempts to return those
harmed to the ex-ante status quo. In its fullest form, it requires tracing
the impact of the anticompetitive harm through layers of buyers and
sellers. For example, a horizontal agreement on the price of a raw
material may have an impact on manufacturers of a product, as well as
its wholesalers, retailers and final customers. More importantly it would
require that defendants be allowed to employ a pass on defense. If this
were not the case, there would be overcompensation. On the other hand,
a focus on deterrence means that it is important to have at least one
highly motivated plaintiff who has much to gain from a successful
action whether or not that gain is equal to the actual loss suffered. This
means disallowing a pass on defense and adding a punitive element. It is
important to note, however, that there is no empirical reason to believe
that deterrence means compensation goals are not largely met in the
sense that the harms to be compensated do not occur in the first place.
An excellent example of how the deterrence and compensation
policies interact is Illinois Brick.29 A compensation function would have
likely meant allowing indirect purchasers to recover. This too could
potentially reduce the damages paid since the impact as one goes the
through the chain of distribution likely decreases along with the ease of
demonstrating the amount of actual loss. A policy of no indirect action,
when coupled with the disallowance of a pass on defense means one set
of directly affected plaintiffs will have the maximum incentive to bring
an action. This is not entirely inconsistent with compensation but it
relegates compensation to a secondary concern. On the other hand,
exposure to treble damages may mean aggressive private action by
those directly affected and, in a sense, protect downstream purchasers
from harm.
B. The European Union
A comparison of the U.S. and E.U. standards with respect to injury,
standing, and damages cannot be a straightforward one in part because
private enforcement in the European Union is still relatively infrequent
and the doctrines are considerably less stable than in the United States.
30
29. Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 720.
30. See generally Sittenreich, supra note 4; Ingrid Gubbay & David Romain, Plaintiff
Recovery Actions, EUR. ANTITRUST REv. (2011); David Romain & Ingrid Gubbay, Competition
Claims: Uneven Progress, Still, 2001 EuR. ANTITRUST REv. 47; John Pheasant, Damages
[Vol. 26
THE LA WAND ECONOMICS OF (FUNCTIONAL) ANTITRUST STANDING
Private antitrust actions must be brought in national courts. The issues
of standing and injury are generally regarded as procedural, and each
national court's procedural rules govern. These rules often differ from
nation to nation.31 In addition, the distinction between standing and
"functional standing" is especially important. Even the most liberal
notions of standing do not translate into functional standing if financial
incentives are absent. This means the regimes could be very much alike
with respect to standing and injury but overall be very different with
respect to private enforcement generally.
A good place to start in attempting to understand the lack of clarity
and the limitations in the European Union with respect to private actions
is Courage v. Crehan,32 the case most responsible for initiating greater
interest in private actions. The court in that case wrote that enforcement
"must be open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to
him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort
competition."33 The "any individual" wording strongly suggests a broad
notion of standing and "caused to him" is consistent with a
compensation goal. That theme is reflected in the 2008 White Paper
34
which includes a number of specific proposals designed to facilitate an
increase in private actions. The White Paper clearly focuses on
"compensation" as the primary goal of private actions.35 Thus, plaintiffs
should "receive full compensation of the real value of the loss
suffered.36 In addition, "[fqull compensation is the . . . first and
foremost guiding principle." 7 The drafters of the White Paper do
observe that greater compensation will mean a greater level of
deterrence but any real effort to include a deterrence element to private
enforcement is undercut by a continued reluctance to allow for punitive
damages or contingent fee arrangements. Interestingly, the White Paper
deviated from the Green Paper 38 created three years earlier, by dropping
Actions for Breach of Antitrust Rules: The European Commission's Green Paper, 27 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REv. 367 (2006); Thomas Rouhette, The Availability of Punitive Damages in
Europe: A Growing Trend or a Non Existent Concept, 74 DEF. COUNSEL J. 320 (2007).
3 1. Christopher J. Cook, Private Enforcement ofE. U Competition Law in Member State
Courts: Experience to Date and Path Ahead, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 3 (2008).
32. Case C-453-499, Courage v. Crehan [2001] ECR 1-6297.
33. European Commission 2008, White Paper on Damage Claims for Breach of EC
Antitrust Rules, COM 165 final [hereinafter White Paper]. See generally Tim Reher, The
Commission's White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 2009
EUR. ANTITRUST REv. 38 (2009).
34. White Paper, supra note 33, at 2.
35. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id.
38. European Commission 2005, Green Paper on Damages for Breach of the EC Antitrust
Rules, COM 672 final [hereinafter Green Paper].
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a proposal for punitive damages. In effect, the European Union opts to
rely on public enforcement as the principal deterrence instrument39 and,
as noted earlier, this can have what might be viewed as an ex ante
compensation effect.40 Whether this is a realistic expectation is another
matter. Nevertheless, when compared to the United States, the European
Union has opted to use private actions almost exclusively for
compensation.
One of the stickier issues that falls within the discussion of
compensation and deterrence is the availability of a pass on defense.
The 2006 Green Paper suggests a variety of options for dealing with the
direct/indirect purchaser problem, including both allowing and not
allowing the pass on defense.4 1 The more recent White Paper is more
specific and proposes that defendants (infringers) be permitted to apply
a "passing on" defense42 and plaintiffs may make offensive use of the
pass on theory. It is important to remember, though, that these
statements do not ensure compliance by national courts. Nevertheless,
in theory, a fully developed compensation approach would mean that
defendants who were able to show that plaintiffs had passed
overcharges onto downstream purchasers43 would be able to deduct
those amounts from an award. Otherwise, there would be
overcompensation. The impact of this deviation from U.S. policy is to
increase the compensation goal of private actions while decreasing the
deterrence goal. Indeed, one of the arguments for compensation over
deterrence is the express desire not to become like the United States.
44
All of these themes are found in the more recent 2013 Proposal45 which
does increase the possibility of national uniformity but still lacks the
critical element of providing a significant financial incentive.
One interesting lack of clarity is raised by the decision in Courage
and relates to the notion of antitrust injury. A literal interpretation of the
wording in Courage allows an action by someone injured as the result
of a market "distortion." Whether "distortion" is the same as movement
from more competitive to less competitive conditions is not clear.
Veljko Milutinovic offers the example of a situation in which small
competitors collude to compete more effectively against a dominant
39. See Sittenreich, supra note 4; Woulter P.J Wils, The Relationship Between Public
Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages, 32 WORLD COMPETITION 2 (2009).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
41. Green Paper, supra note 38.
42. White Paper, supra note 33.
43 In addition, if downstream purchasers were permitted to act as plaintiffs, the amount of
overcharge they passed on would be deductible.
44. VELJKO MILUTINOVIC, THE "RIGHT TO DAMAGES" UNDER E.U. COMPETITION LAW
(Amsterdam, Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer 2010).
45. See "Proposal," supra note 3.
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firm..4 6 Suppose the dominant firm then brings a private action against
the colluding firms. In the United States there would be antitrust injury
questions, if not a clear resolution, because the goal of the dominant
firm would be to use the antitrust laws to decrease competition. In the
European Union, however, the dominant firm may be viewed as having
suffered antitrust injury as a result of a market distortion. At least at this
point, there is no legislative authority like that in the United States that
would further define the kind of injury that must be suffered before the
antitrust laws can be invoked.
There can be little doubt that at the highest levels, E.U. officials and
agencies intend to increase private antitrust actions. Recent discussions,
however, suggest this urging has not been successful as an overall
matter.47 Moreover, it appears that any thought that private antitrust
actions will increase substantially is optimistic. Private actions are risky
especially in the absence of contingent fees and punitive damages.
Added to this are indications that increased standing for private parties
will be accompanied by a pass on defense and the offensive use of the
pass on rationale.
C. A Comparison
Although E.U. and U.S. policies with respect to standing, injury, and
indirect purchases can be viewed at different stages of development,
there are probably more important policy considerations at work. These
policy considerations result in a nearly opposite approach to private
actions. In the United States at one level, private enforcement has been
designed to be deterrent-oriented and to encourage private actions. Yet,
at the same time, the impact of court decisions has been to make the
system far less open to plaintiffs. It does not appear to be by accident
that at the same time the U.S. Supreme Court was decreasing the scope
46. MILUTINOVOC, supra note 44, at 232-33.
47. See Rizzuto, supra note 4; Gubbay & Romain, supra note 30. This may be changing
with the 2013 release of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Counsel, but this is far from obvious. See Valentine Mercea, "The Private Enforcement of
Competition Rules in the E.U. - A New Starting Line?" Competition Policy International,
https://www.competitionpolicyintemational.com/assets/Uploads/EUAugust.pdf (last visited,
Jan. 28. 2014); Daniele Calisti & Luke Haasbeek, The Proposal for a Directive on Antitrust
Damages Actions: The European Commission Sets the Stage for Private Enforcement in the
European Union, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Aug. 12, 2013,
https://www.competitionpolicyintemational. com/the-proposal-for-a-directive-on-antitrust-
damages-actions-the-european-commission-sets-th e-stage-for-private-enforcement-in-the-
european-union/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
48. See Tim Reher, The Commission's White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of
the EC Antitrust Rules, 2009 EUROPEAN ANTITRUST REV. 38 (2009); Monique Hazelhorst,
Private Enforcement of E. U Competition Law: Why Punitive Damages are a Step Too Far,
2010 ECONOMIC REV. OF PRIVATE LAW 757 (2010).
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of the substantive reach of the U.S. antitrust laws in order to focus on
economic efficiency and consumer welfare, it was also narrowing the
range of possible plaintiffs.49 Considered together, the effect of these
two changes was to decrease the likelihood of so-called false positive-
practices incorrectly labeled as anticompetitive. Nevertheless, there are
powerful incentives for private parties to bring antitrust actions in the
United States and these incentives further the compensation function as
well.
In the United States, defendants may not subtract from the
overcharge amounts passed on to the customers of the plaintiff. In all
likelihood this means overcompensation for direct purchases but also
means a significant deviation from a compensation model since indirect
purchasers may not recover for overcharges passed on. It is also worth
noting that indirect purchasers to whom the overcharge is passed on
may themselves be sellers. If they raise prices and therefore sell less the
consequence is a loss in profits. This decline in profit is also not
recoverable.
In the European Union, a far different dynamic is in play. There
seems to be a general desire to rely on public enforcement as a source of
deterrence. If deterrence is sufficiently high, compensation becomes a
secondary problem. Nevertheless the policy trend, if not the reality, has
been to increase the availability of compensation to private parties.
Because damages are limited to single damages, this movement, if
successful will have little impact on deterrence since, if left to private
actions alone, the net effect of anticompetitive activities may be profit
maximizing for firms engaged in those activities. Paradoxically, the
increase in the availability of private actions may not increase
"functional standing" or have the desired impact on compensation.
IlI. ECONOMIC MODELS 50
Basic economic models illustrate that the antitrust remedies available
in the United States are not compensatory and they also illustrate what
would be compensatory. Compensation, though, is at best an ideal. As
explained here, even a moderately comprehensive effort to compensate
in the absence of punitive damages and the ability to aggregate claims is
likely to fail. The three models below are explained in the text with a
more formal presentation found in the margins.
49. See Sullivan & Harrison, supra note 17, at 240-45.
50. Much of the following can be understood without a complete understanding of the
economic models. Readers should be able to follow the logic.
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A. Model 1: Price Fixing and Consumers
In Model 1, price fixing firms are selling to consumers. The
important feature of this model is that buyers do not resell. U.S. law
allows a recovery for "three-fold" the damages suffered. In the typical
price fixing case this means three times the overcharge5 1 per unit
multiplied by the number of units purchased during the period of price
fixing.52 It is important to note that the ability to raise prices must be
accompanied by a decrease in output or supply. Thus, suppose
consumers are buying 5000 units at $3. Due to price fixing the price
increases to $4 and only 4000 units are sold. In the United States, the
measure of damages would be the $1 overcharge times the 4000 units
purchased. Of course, no consumer is likely to litigate over $1 per unit
but in a class action with larger amounts involved and damages tripled
private enforcement might well occur.
On the other hand, leaving out damages associated with the 1000
fewer units sold is a much bigger problem. These former buyers do not
have standing. Precisely how one calculates the damages to consumers
who stop purchasing a product is not entirely clear. Technically, they
lose what economists label consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is the
difference between what is paid for the product and the most the
consumer is willing to pay. One could think of it as a psychic profit
associated with the purchase. Because this damage is associated with a
hypothetical transaction giving rise to a psychic benefit, it is very
difficult to determine. Consequently the U.S. remedy falls well short of
compensation. This may not be important if the threat of suit by those
who do purchase is a serious enough deterrent but this may or may not
be the case.
In the European Union, overcharge is also the measure of damages.
The recovery is equal to single damages, meaning that any deterrent
effect is very diluted. To understand this concept, it is important to
recall that an action which only allows plaintiffs to recoup the gains of
defendants associated with price fixing is one that invites illegal
activity. The reasoning is that the probability of recovery is less than
100% and the expected amount recouped would be less than that
illegally taken. On balance price fixing would be profitable in the long
run. If the damages uffered by those no longer purchasing were added
to those of buyers continuing to purchase, the possible total recovery
could exceed the gains to those in violation and enhance the deterrent
51. The evolution of the "overcharge" measure of damages has been examined
elsewhere. Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price
Enhancement Cases, 64 MINN. L. REv. 751, 753, 770-72 (1980).
52. Consumer damages are often very low on a consumer by consumer basis. Thus, the
availability of collective redress in the form of class actions is critical for functional standing.
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effect. In reality, though, in the absence of an ability to combine claims
and the difficulty of quantifying lost consumer surplus mean the
probability of private actions by consumers in the European Union for
compensation or deterrence purposes is very low.53 Standing, while
broadly defined, cannot be regarded as functional.
B. Model 2: Price Fixing to Those Reselling
The analysis is considerably more complex when the purchaser from
those fixing prices is itself reselling.54 In this case, the direct victim is
the purchaser of what is called an "intermediate good.,55 The good
purchased may be resold to consumers or combined with other inputs to
produce a different good which is passed down the chain of distribution
to be transformed by downstream firms. As a consequence of the price
increase two things happen: The purchaser of the intermediate good
decreases the units purchased; because it now purchases less at a higher
cost, it produces less and raises its own prices.
In terms of actual harm, the purchasing firm, now paying more for
inputs and selling less, is actually harmed by a decrease in profit. Since
prices increase, those buying from that firm are also injured. They pay
53. In more formal language, the prices charged in a market in which purchases are made
by consumers without price fixing collusion is compared to one in which price fixing exists. In
Figure 1 in the Appendix, before collusion, the price is PI and the quantity purchased is Q1. The
consumer surplus enjoyed by buyers is the area of triangle P 1AR. Using the standard model, if
price fixing results in an elevation of price to P2, quantity purchased will decline to Q2. Now
consumer surplus is P2BR. It has been decreased by the area PIP2BA. In the typical antitrust
case, the amount recovered by the affected consumers would be the area P1P2BC. The area
PI P2BC is not, however, the same as the total loss to consumers. It leaves out the area ABC,
which is the loss to consumers no longer buying the product. As noted above, one might excuse
the U.S. system because it does not purport to be primarily aimed at compensation. For the
European Union, however, this is a failure to achieve the stated policy goals.
54. In this particular case, it is assumed the resale takes place under imperfectly
competitive conditions.
55. In Figure 2 (Appendix 1), D represents the demand that firm faces for its output. For
purposes of simplicity, it is assumed that marginal cost and variable cost are the same and equal
to Cl. It is also assumed that one unit of input translates to one unit of output. Following
standard microeconomic theory, the firm sells where its marginal cost and marginal revenue
intersect. In the case of Cl, this is at QI. The price charged is the highest consistent with that
level of output. Here that price is Pl. Now suppose, due to the collusion of suppliers, the
average cost and marginal cost curve increase to C2. Again, applying the standard analysis, the
new profit maximizing quantity is Q2 and the profit maximizing price is P2. At this point it is
useful to note two possible measures of damages. The overcharge, as in the consumer model, is
the difference between Cl and C2 and the total recognized damage is the area of rectangle
CI C2DE. On the other hand, the actual harm suffered is lost profits. Prior to the price fixing, the
profit, including contributions to overhead, was C l P I BF. After price fixing, profit has declined
to C2P2AD. There seems to be little question that an actual compensatory award for the direct
purchaser would be C 1P 1BF-C2P2AD.
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more for the good and they too purchase less from the direct buyers and
their profits decline.56 In fact, if there are several firms in the chain of
distribution, all of them may be negatively affected. Less obvious is the
impact on firms that supply the price fixing firms. Firms fixing prices
produce less as a result of having raised their own prices and therefore
buy less of other inputs for their suppliers. This means these upstream
suppliers are also damaged.
In the United States, purchasers from the price fixing firm may
recover the amount of the overcharge times three. Those parties are the
only ones with standing and the only ones that stand to recover even
though actual harm can go up and down the chain of production and
distribution. Even if directly purchasing firms pass part of the
overcharge to their customers, they collect the full amount of the
overcharge. Downstream firms may not recover even if they do pay
more for the good or suffer a decrease in profits. In other words, there is
no defensive or offensive use of the pass on theory. This simplifies
things but means compensation is unlikely. Again, though,
compensation is not the goal of U.S. antitrust law.
In the European Union all of this would be treated quite differently.
Under the White Paper proposal, standing would evidently extend well
beyond the directly affected purchasers. In order to facilitate the ability
of remote purchasers to recover damages, the White Paper recommends
that they be armed with a rebuttable presumption that the "illegal
overcharge was passed onto them in its entirety." Even further, one of
the leading cases on the issue of damages, Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico
Assicurazioni SpA, notes that "it follows from the principle of
effectiveness and the right of any individual to seek compensation for
loss caused by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort
competition that injured persons must be able to seek compensation not
only for actual loss (damnum emergens) but also for loss of profit
(lucrum cessans) plus interest."57 Thus, in theory, a truly compensatory
model could stretch as far up and down the chain of distribution as
possible.
As in the prior model, the E.U. standard with respect to standing is
broad but is not functional. It is unlikely to be of consequence with
respect to deterrence, which is expected, but it almost certainly will fall
short as far as compensation. Again, it is a matter of costs and benefits
from the perspective of those who are harmed. In the absence of
punitive damages, the maximum recovered is equal to actual harm but
the expected recovery is far less. Plaintiffs would be engaged in a
56. These purchasers could be consumers, in which case they suffer a decrease in
consumer surplus.
57. Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, [2006] E.C.R. 1-6619.
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difficult process of tracing damages through layers of distribution with
each one perhaps finding that its own damages is but a tiny sliver of all
the damages caused. And, since the tiny slivers cannot be joined into a
class action, the probability of actual compensation drops further.
Interestingly, there seems to be no reason to believe that the goal of
compensation would be achieved in the proposed E.U. system, which
focuses on compensation, than the U.S. system which does not.
C. Model 3: Monopsony Power and Collusion on the Buying
Side of the Market
A very similar analysis to the one described above can be applied to
collusion on the buying side of the market. When buyers collude to
achieve lower prices from suppliers they exert what is called
"monopsony" power.58 Typically, when one thinks of buying power it
involves the purchase of labor. 9 The condition can and does exist at
every level of the production and distribution chain and affects a great
variety of inputs.6 What makes the analysis a bit confusing are the
questions of why antitrust policy should oppose the use of buying power
and, if so, who has standing. The substantive question of why oppose
the use of buying power flows from the fact that those with buying
power seek to lower prices. Lower prices, one might reason, leads to
lower costs of production throughout the chain of production and
distribution, eventually benefitting consumers. The problem with this
analysis can be understood fairly easily. When firms collude to force
suppliers to charge lower prices, suppliers will sell lower amounts.
When lower amounts are supplied, the buyers then produce less of their
own output. It is basic economics that lower amounts supplied lead to
higher costs. In other words, buying pressure to achieve lower prices
does not mean customers of those applying that pressure ultimately
benefit.
61
It is easy to understand the difference between harm caused and
compensation if one thinks of the monopsony as the mirror image of the
two models described above.6 2 In the United States, plaintiffs-in this
58. For a complete discussion of the monopsony problem, see ROGER D. BLAIR &
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (2010).
59. An example would be a so-called company town in which there is but one employer
(buyer) of labor.
60. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 58, at 1-15.
61. Id. at48.
62. The more formal analysis is as follows: demand for the input is determined by how
profitable it is for a firm to purchase and use an additional unit of the input. This is marginal
revenue product (MRP). See Figure 3, Appendix 1. Demand and supply intersect at QI. The
price for the input in this competitive market is P 1. If buyers collude, they no longer accept the
market determined price but set the price. This means comparing the profitability of each
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case sellers faced by powerful buyers-are typically entitled to what
can be viewed as the "undercharge" times the number of units that they
sell at the lower price. The undercharge is the difference between the
price that would have been charged but for the collusion on the buying
side of the market and the price actually charged. Again this difference
is multiplied by the units actually bought and sold. The problem is that
some units that were bought and sold before price fixing are no longer
sold. These units were profitable to the seller but they do not lead to a
recovery. In effect, the undercharge measure is not compensatory and in
the United States it is not intended to be.
It is important to note that the harm is not just that suffered by the
sellers to the price fixing firms. Because those sellers now sell less, they
are likely to purchase less of whatever inputs they require in their
production process. Thus, suppliers to the direct victims are worse off.
Plus, since the firms fixing prices sell less and raise their own prices, the
impact is also felt down the chain of distribution. All of this would be
accounted for if the system aims to be fully compensatory.
The monopsony problem is a relatively new one to U.S. courts and
antitrust officials.6 In the European Union there appears to be even less
consideration of monopsony, and it poses many complex problems
nearly all of which mean the compensation ideal is unrealistic. For
example, a compensatory system would presumably include allowances
for pass throughs. Thus, if a firm forced to sell at a lower price can
somehow then exact a lower price from its suppliers this would have to
be accounted for. And again, all those negatively affected up and down
the supply chain would have to demonstrate how their profits were
impacted by a price fixing arrangement among firms that could be
several tiers removed. Obviously, this is a virtually insurmountable task
and one made riskier by the absence of punitive damages and ability to
aggregate claims.
additional unit of input purchased with its marginal cost or marginal factor cost. For all units out
to Q2, the marginal revenue product exceeds the marginal factor cost. This net gain ends at Q2,
which is now the profit maximizing level of input purchases. The price is set at the lowest price
consistent with obtaining Q2 units of input or P2. The difference in the price paid per unit after
collusion is P2-PI. The quantity sold is Q2. Thus, the measure of damages is P2-PI(Q2), or the
area PIP2AB. Depending on the status in direct sellers, this amount may be allocated among
plaintiffs at two or more levels. The actual harm resulting from monopsony power is the area
P1P2CA. This measure accounts for the impact of sellers who decrease sales as a result of the
lower price.
63. The first mention of monopsony power by the U.S. Supreme Court is found in In re
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases. 390 U.S. 747, 795 n.61 (1968). Although responding to
monopsony antitrust issues at earlier dates, the Court's most comprehensive treatment is
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
A comparison of U.S. and E.U. standards with respect to antitrust
injury and antitrust standing is only meaningful in the context of the
goals of the two systems of antitrust. Even in that broader context the
process is difficult and broad conclusions risky because the relevance of
private antitrust actions in the European Union has yet to be determined.
Although there are expressions in favor of a substantial expansion, there
are significant barriers.
Although each system of private enforcement is concerned at some
level with both deterrence and compensation, when faced with
choosing, the United States favors a deterrence goal while the European
Union favors a compensation goal. There is probably little difference in
the antitrust injury requirement between the jurisdictions. On the other
hand, the European Union appears to have a more liberal standard with
respect to standing. This is, in part, a result of its emphasis on
compensation.
Ironically, the United States may, at least in the context of private
actions, do a better job with respect to both deterrence and
compensation. The key here is not standing and injury but the ability to
aggregate claims and the availability of punitive damages. To
understand the compensation point it is important to note that
compensation is not necessary if deterrence is successful. Thus, in the
United States, with a more powerful system of private enforcement,
there is what might be called the ex ante effect of ensuring the harm
does occur in the first place. In effect, treble damages have two results.
They create an important incentive for private parties to initiate private
actions. Second, that threat and the deterrence it provides can mean
there are fewer instances in which compensation would be called for.
The European Union appears to occupy what might be called a no
man's land with respect to private enforcement. As it currently stands,
private actions are unlikely to have an important compensatory or
deterrent effect. The reasons are clear. First, many of the remedies in the
European Union have a disgorgement quality. The worst case outcome
for colluding firms may be simply to return the unlawful gains. If the
probability of detection and liability is less than one, it is in the interest
of firms to collude. Second, even when damages are calculated as lost
profits, those deserving of compensation may react to small recoveries.
This tendency may be offset by increased criminalization or public
enforcement, but the announced goals at this point are compensation
oriented and that goal is likely unattainable under current functional
standing requirements.
[Vol. 26










290 FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 26
Figure 2
P2 KA
P1
E\
C2 C2.
MR
Q
Q2
